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USE OF ZONING RESTRICTIONS TO RESTRAIN
PROPERTY OWNERS FROM ALTERING OR
DESTROYING HISTORIC LANDMARKS
Because of the actual or imminent destruction of many historically
significant buildings,1 there has been a strong protest from those Amer-
icans who wish to preserve the remaining vestiges of our history and
cultural background. In response to this protest, governmental action
has been taken at the federal,2 state,8 and local' levels. State and local
governments have borne the brunt of this effort. These authorities can
1. Over half of the 12,000 buildings listed in the Historic Building Survey under-
taken by the federal government in 1933 had been razed by 1970. Conti, Preserving
the Past, Wall Street J., Aug. 10, 1970, at 1, col. 1. The threat to historical landmarks
is greatest in urban areas, where the demands for additional housing and commercial
space result in very high property values.
2. The federal government's interest in preserving our national heritage was evi-
denced by the passage of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966. 16 U.S.C.
§§ 470 et seq. (1970).
The Act has a threefold purpose:
(1) to establish the National Register of districts, sites, and structures signifi-
cant in American history, architecture, archaeology, and culture;(2) to encourage programs at state and local levels to protect such properties;
and(3) to establish the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation which will co-
ordinate public and private preservation efforts.
The focus of the Act is on protection of the National Register properties through
matching grants-in-aid to states and to the National Trust for Historic Preservation, id.
§ 470(a), and through training and education, id. § 470(j) (5). Thus, federal partici-
pation in historic preservation efforts is chiefly supplemental to state and local efforts.
3. Every state now has passed some form of historic preservation law. See J. MOR-
iuSON, HISTORIC PEsEVATioN LAW 6-9, 12-15, 61-126 (1965).
The various preservation steps employed by states include state-wide surveys of his-
toric landmarks, the creation of historic districts, acquisition by eminent domain of his-
toric property or of restrictive easements over the facade of such buildings, tax conces-
sions to owners who preserve their historic property, and limitations on competing public
projects. For an evaluation of these various techniques employed by state preservation
legislation and a description of the various results achieved, see Wilson & Winkler, The
Response of State Legislation to Historic Preservation, 36 LAw & CoNTrMP. PROB. 329
(1971).
4. Local preservation efforts usually begin with lobbying and presentation of bills
to the state legislature. Such bills tend to delegate to local authorities the powers neces-
sary for historic preservation. See generally J. MoRRIsoN, supra note 3, at 9-11, 15-
19, 129-86. However, some local governments have instituted preservation programs
without specific state authorization. The Supreme Court of New Mexico upheld the
power of Santa Fe under a general zoning enabling act to create an historic district with-
out express legislative authority. See City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M.
410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964). For a discussion of the responses of New York City and
New Orleans to historic preservation, see notes 64-66 and 95-96 infra and accompanying
text. See also Tinkcom, The Philadelphia Historical Commission: Organization and
Procedures, 36 LAw & CoNTENT. PRo. 386 (1971).
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rely upon two powers to preserve historic monuments: eminent do-
main and the police power.5 Although historic preservation is a valid
use of the power of eminent domain, 6 the exercise of this power carries
with it a requirement of compensating the landowner,7 and the cost of
compensating owners usually will prohibit widespread application of
the power of eminent domain." Therefore, the only generally effective
mechanisms for historic preservation have been derived from the police
power, and the most effective use of the police power for this purpose
has been the use of zoning restrictions.9
5. Other less common methods include tax incentives and urban renewal programs.
See Comment, Legal Methods of Historic Preservation, 19 BUFFALO L. REv. 611, 616
(1970).
An alternative approach, the "Chicago Plan" of development rights transfer, has
been suggested by Professor Costonis. See Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive
Zoning and the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REv. 574 (1972). This
proposal was inspired by New York City's plan for transfer of authorized development
rights from landmark sites to adjacent lots in certain districts within New York City.
Nnw YonK, N.Y., ZONiNG RESOLrIrrON art. VII, ch. 4, §§ 74-79, -791 to -793 (1971).
Under the Chicago Plan, the landmark commission would obtain an appraisal of the eco-
nomic effects of landmark designation and then determine a compensation "package" for
the owner, consisting of an authorization to transfer the development rights of up to one
hundred per cent of the landmark's lot area and a reduction in the real estate tax on
the lot. Costonis, supra at 591-93.
6. As early as 1896 the Supreme Court held that the power of eminent domain
may be exercised properly to preserve historic property. United States v. Gettysburg
Elec. Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896); accord, Roe v. Kansas ex rel. Smith, 278 U.S. 191
(1929), dismissing appeal from State ex rel. Smith v. Kemp, 124 Kan. 716, 261 P. 556
(1927). In allowing the federal government to condemn land for the Gettysburg Na-
tional Military Reservation, the Supreme Court noted that discussion of the day con-
flicted over two proposed definitions of "public use"; one stressing the importance of
a "right to use on the part of the public" and the other emphasizing "public benefit,
utility or advantage." 160 U.S. at 674. The Court concluded that state benefit from
inspiration of partriotism, love of country, and appreciation for the historical signifi-
cance of the Civil War justifies public use of the property. Id. at 681-82.
The Gettysburg Electric Railway case has been followed in upholding acts of emi-
nent domain by the states for the purpose of historic preservation. See e.g., State ex
rel. Smith v. Kemp, 124 Kan. 716, 261 P. 556 (1927), appeal dismissed, 278 U.S. 191
(1929). The Supreme Court of Kansas upheld a state condemnation proposal for a site
of historical interest. Basing the decision on the "public use" doctrine, the court ex-
plained the benefits of historic preservation:
The end to be subserved by state promotion of intellectual and moral improve-
ment is better citizenship; and good citizenship is inculcated by giving atten-
tion to history as history is now conceived. History is no longer a record of
past events. It is an illuminating account of the expanding life of man in all
its manifestations, revealing how each stage of civilization grows out of pre-
ceding stages, revealing how the past still lives in us and still dominates us,
and enabling us to profit by what has gone before. So considered, history
is inspirational. Id. at 721, 261 P. at 558.
7. Williams v. Parker, 188 U.S. 491, 494 (1903).
8. See Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 134,
316 N.E.2d 305, 313, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 18 (1974) (dissenting opinion).
9. Non-zoning uses of the police power to protect landmarks include anti-neglect
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A'severe type of zoning restriction which is finding increasing use
is simply to forbid private owners of historical structures to demolish
or alter their property without approval of the local preservation com-
mission.'0 Because of the onerous effect of such regulations, affected
property owners are beginning to challenge them, either to force aban-
donment of the restrictions or to force the government to compensate
them." Courts have differed in their responses to 'these challenges.
The main issue presented is whether the restrictions constitute a taking
of property without compensation in violation of due process. If so,
only the power of eminent domain, with its correlative requirement of
compensation, remains. The effect of finding a "taking" will generally
be to frustrate the historic preservation effort.' 2
This Note will examine the constitutionality of imposing such zon-
ing restrictions without compensation. First, it will present the several
current tests for "taking." Thereafter it will examine the nature of the
constitutional standards for historic preservation efforts generally.
Next it will present the two current, contrasting judicial attitudes toward
restrictions upon owners' rights to demolish or alter their historic build-
ings. The Note concludes that such restrictions are generally constitu-
tional when the proper legal standard is applied.
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR HISTORIC
PRESERVATION ORDINANCES
The "Taking" Concept
Although regulations upon the use of property must satisfy the
general tests applicable to all uses of the police power,' 3 the principal
question involved in governmental regulations for the preservation of
private property is whether the restriction is of such magnitude as to
constitute a taking. Whenever the restrictions on the owner's free use
ordinances and anti-demolition statutes. While these regulations are based on the police
power to protect the health and safety of the public in an historic site or district, they
are generally more stringent than safety standards applicable to other areas. See NEw
YoRE, N.Y., CHARTER & ADmiN. CODE, ch. 8A, § 207-10.0 (1971). Such anti-neglect
ordinances are vital to thwart the unsuccessful applicant for demolition who decides to
let his property totally deteriorate in order to circumvent the historic preservation laws.
Id. § 207-11.0 (1971).
10. See e.g., id. ch. 9-A, §§ 207-1.0, et seq. (1965); NEw ORLEANS, LA., Ciy CODE
§§ 65-1 to -33 (1940).
11. See e.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974);
Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305,
359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974).
12. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 46-53 infra and accompanying text.
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and enjoyment are sufficient to amount to a "confiscation" of his prop-
erty, there is a taking. 4 If a taking is involved, due process demands
compensation to the owner of the historic property. 5
In the absence of clear guidance from the Supreme Court, a con-
fusing assortment of tests has arisen to describe what constitutes a tak-
ing.' Among the numerous standards suggested, three general tests
of judicial origin enjoy the most substantial authority in determining
whether a taking has occurred: the "physical invasion" test, the "nox-
ious use" test, and the "diminution-in-value" test. Not infrequently
courts will employ a combination of these tests without clearly defining
the different standards being used. 17
The Physical Invasion Test. The "physical invasion" test requires
the government to compensate whenever it takes physical possession
of the affected premises.' In such cases the confiscation is apparent.
14. See 2 J. SACKMAN, NICHOLS' THE LAw OF EMINENT DoMIsN § 6.1[1] (rev. 3d
ed. 1974).
An interference with the value of private property has been held to constitute a tak-
ing. See, e.g., Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d 565 (CL Cl. 1965); Forster v.
Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 32 N.E. 976 (1893); Penn v. Carolina Virginia Coastal Corp., 231
N.C. 481, 57 S.E.2d 817 (1950); Steinle v. City of Cincinnati, 142 Ohio 550, 53 N.E.2d
800 (1944). Contra, Ledbetter v. Beach, 220 Tenn. 623, 421 S.W.2d 814 (1967).
15. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). In Pennsylvania
Coal the appellant successfully argued that "[w]henever the use of the land is restricted
in any way or some incorporeal hereditament is taken away which was appurtenant
thereto, it constitutes as much a taking as if the land itself had been appropriated." Id.
at 395 (citations omitted).
16. The Court has not developed a clearer definition of "taking" since the Pennsyl-
vania Coal case. At times the Court still follows the "physical invasion" test discussed
in notes 18-19 infra and accompanying text. See, e.g., United States v. Central Eureka
Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 165-66 (1958).
17. See note 21 infra and text accompanying notes 25-26 infra.
18. The physical invasion test originated in the old state cases. See e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53 (1851); Coates v. City of New York, 7
Cow. 585 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1827).
The United States Supreme Court employed this test in Transportation Co. v. Chi-
cago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878), where a landowner complained of property damage resulting
from the city's construction of a nearby tunnel. In upholding a verdict for the city, the
Court emphasized the fact that there was no physical invasion of the claimant's prop-
erty:
[A]cts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not directly
encroaching upon private property, though their consequences may impair its
use, are universally held not to be a taking within the meaning of the constitu-
tional provision. They do not entitle the owner of such property to compen-
sation from the State or its agents, or give him any right of action. Id. at
642.
See also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). But see Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1872). In the latter case the Court held that permanent flood-
ing of private property might be regarded as a "taking":
It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if . . . it shall be
held that if the government refrains from the absolute conversion of real prop-
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However, while it is universally agreed that the state must provide com-
pensation when it occupies the property, an actual physical invasion of
the property is no longer an absolute requisite for the owner's right to
compensation.19
The Noxious Use Test. Another judicial approach to the problem
of taking has been the "noxious use" test, which defines a specific, valid
exercise of the police power. Under this test, the court examines the
nature of the property use which is limited by a governmental regula-
tion. If the use so affected is determined to be prejudicial to public
health, safety, or morals, then the government may validly regulate it,
and any resulting decrease in the value of the property need not be
compensated.20
On the other hand, as a corollary to the noxious use test, some
courts have concluded that where a municipality cannot show that a
nuisance or harm is being abated, then the property owner has suffered
a taking.2 ' Under this corollary test, if the purpose of the regulation
is to secure some benefit for the entire community at the expense of
the landowners rather than to prevent a nuisance, then there is a taking.
Zoning regulations prohibiting draining and filling swampland" and
erty to the uses of the public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict
irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in effect, subject it to
total destruction without making any compensation, because in the narrowest
sense of that word, it is not taken for the public use. Such a construction
would pervert the constitutional provision into a restriction upon the rights of
-the citizen ...and make it an authority for invasion of private right under
the pretext of the public good, which had no warrant in the laws or practices
of our ancestors. Id. at 177-78.
However, the Court pointed out in Transportation Co. that there was a physical invasion
of the private property and a practical ouster by the floodwaters in Pumpelly. 99 U.S.
at 642.
19. See text accompanying note 28 infra.
20. For example, the state, without payment of compensation, may prohibit the op-
eration of a brickyard in a residential neighborhood on the grounds that the brickyard
is offensive to the public health. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915). See
also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (prohibition of sand and
gravel pits); L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587 (1900) (forbiddance of houses of
prostitution outside of designated area); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (ban
on alcoholic beverage manufacturing plants); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659
(1878) (prohibition of fertilizer manufacturing plant).
21. See e.g., State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970); Aronson v. Town
of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 602-04, 195 N.E.2d 341, 344-45 (1964); Morris County Land
Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 554-56, 193 A.2d
232, 241-42 (1963). In these three cases the courts invalidated ordinances in situations
where no nuisance or harm was perceived on the" basis that a public benefit, the burden
of which should be borne by the whole community, was secured by the regulation. The
courts also relied on the diminution-in-value test. See notes 25-28 infra and accompany-
ing text.
22. See State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970); Morris County Land Im-
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preventing development of rural property into small, economically feas-
ible lot sizes23 in order to maintain a more pleasant community have
been held to be takings under this test. The premise of this "noxious
use" corollary is that the costs of such public benefits should be borne
by the entire public rather than the individual landowner.2"
The Diminution-in-Value Test. The standard which is probably
most often used (sometimes as an alternate to the noxious use test)25
is the "diminution-in-value" test.20 This test dates back to Pennsyl-
vania Codl Co. v. Mahon,27 a 1922 case, where Justice Holmes stated
for the Supreme Court:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law. As long recognized, some values are enjoyed under
an implied limitation and must yield to the police power. But obviously
the implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due proc-
ess clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such
limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain mag-
nitude, in most if not all cases there must be an exercise of eminent
domain and compensation to sustain the act.28
Thus, under this standard the value of existing interests in property may
be diminished somewhat by a governmental regulation without the re-
quirement of compensation. However, if the regulation substantially
reduces the value of the property, the government must provide com-
pensation.
A recent modification of the diminution-in-value test by the state
courts2 0 has attracted notice for its significant limitation on the original
provement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 554-56, 193 A.2d
232, 241-42 (1963).
23. See Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 602-04, 195 N.E.2d 341, 344-
45 (1964).
24. State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711, 716 (Me. 1970).
25. See note 21 supra.
26. See, e.g., Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d
770 (1964) (invalidating regulation which prevented development of flood plain); La
Salle Natl Bank v. County of Cook, 12 MI1. 2d 40, 145 N.E.2d 65 (1957) (invalidating
regulation zoning as residential property suitable only for industrial or commercial use);
State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970) (setting aside regulation which prevented
landowner from filling in his marsh); Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195
N.E.2d 341 (1964) (declaring void zoning regulation which prevented development of
small, economically feasible lot sizes); Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y.
222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938) (setting aside zoning ordinance which restricted plaintiff's
property to residential use, though it was unsuitable for residential use).
27. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
28. Id. at 413.
29. See Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev.
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rule."° Under this approach, where the regulation seeks to preserve
the status quo rather than to improve the public condition, the impact
upon the value of the land for its potential use does not constitute a
taking. Courts which have employed this test have upheld ordinances
similar to those invalidated under the "noxious use" corollary.3' For
example, in Just v. Marinette County,"2 the Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin upheld a shoreland zoning ordinance forbidding landowners from
placing fill material on their wetland property without a conditional use
permit. While noting that extremely burdensome restrictions on the
property would amount to a taking under the traditional diminution-
in-value test,33 the court held that no taking was involved (and thus
no compensation required) because the ordinance served to prevent
harm from a change in the natural character of the property, rather than
to secure any additional public benefit:34
It seems to us that filling a swamp not otherwise commercially us-
able is not in and of itself an existing use, which is prevented, but rather
is the preparation for some future use which is not indigenous to a
swamp. Too much stress is laid on the right of an owner to change
commercially valueless land when that change does damage to the rights
of the public.35
Regardless of the severity of the restrictions, the modified diminution-
in-value standard does not require compensation for limitations on
potential use of property which serve to maintain the existing condition.
A regulation which would be invalidated under the "noxious use" cor-
ollary as serving the public benefit at 'the expense of the individual
Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970); Just v. Marinette County,
56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
30. See Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 165,
176-77 (1974).
31. Compare Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970) and Just v. Marinette County,
56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) with State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970)
and Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40
N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963).
32. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
33. Id. at 15, 201 N.W.2d at 767.
34. It should be noted that this distinction between harm and benefit is similar to
the noxious use standard. See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text.
When the court views the regulation as securing a benefit for the community, then
it is more likely to require compensation to the landowner. However, when the court
finds only a prevention of harm to the public, then the regulation will be upheld as a
proper exercise of the police power. Given the same fact situation, courts which take
the former view will probably achieve a result which will differ from that of courts
which follow the latter view. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
35. Id. at 22, 201 N.W.2d at 770.
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landowner might nevertheless be upheld under the modified diminu-
tion-in-value test if the public benefit to be derived from the regula-
tion were limited to preventing a detrimental change in the character
of the property. 0
This emerging test is a fair one in that it strikes a proper balance
between the duty to compensate landowners for the impairment of their
property values and the need for flexible use of the police power to
protect the environment. Under the modified diminution-in-value
standard, those restrictions which severely limit the owner's legitimate
expectations of continued use would require compensation, while frus-
tration of more speculative expectations of development potential
would not. Especially since today's historic preservation efforts are
well publicized, restrictions on development of historic properties will
not violate normal community expectations.37
The Arbitral-Enterprise Test. In response to the confusing array
of judicial standards for taking, commentators have suggested numer-
ous additional tests.38  However, of these suggestions, only Professor
Sax's proposed arbitral-enterprise distinction39 has received explicit
judicial recognition.4" Under this standard, when the state resolves dis-
putes between competing private parties in its arbitral capacity, any re-
sulting decrease in value of the landowner's property requires no com-
pensation regardless of the severity of the loss.41 On the other hand,
when the government uses private resources for the public benefit, it
acts in its enterprise capacity and must compensate the owner for the
taking.42 For instance, in Morris County Land Improvement Co. v.
Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills43 the township restricted the use of
the plaintiff's land to public recreational, wildlife sanctuary, and sewage
treatment plant uses. There was a taking because the regulated prop:
erty had been added to the government's resources in several of its en-
terprise capacities.
36. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
37. The sense of justice is offended when normal community expectations are frus-
trated by legal decisions. See E. CAHN, THB SENSE OF INJUsTICE 20-21 (1949).
38. See generally Berger, supra note 30, at 170-95.
39. For an analysis of the problem of "taking" based upon the arbitral-enterprise
distinction, see Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YArE L.J. 36, 61-76 (1964).
40. See Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 128-
29, 316 N.E.2d 305, 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7, 14 (1974).
41. Sax, supra note 39, at 62-63.
42. Id. at 63.
43. 40 NJ. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963). See also Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City
of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954) (court declared unconstitu-
tional zoning ordinance restricting use of plaintiff's property to parking and servicing
of automobiles).
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Zoning, the regulation of land use under the police power, has
proved the most effective means of maintaining the historic character
and appearance of culturally important sites. 44 However, the use of
this power is subject to significant constitutional restrictions; in addition
to the taking doctrine, further limitations are imposed by the due proc-
ess and equal protection clauses. Although these general concepts are
familiar, their application to zoning ordinances raises special problems.45
Due process requires a "public use" for exercise of the police
power through zoning.46  Zoning is essentially negative in operation,
placing certain restrictions on the use of property.47 The major aspect
of the utilization of zoning laws for historic preservation has been to
control the external appearance of structures within district boundaries.
Such aesthetic considerations satisfy the public use requirement for ex-
ercise of the police power as promotion of -the public welfare. 8
44. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
45. See Comment, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Zoning--Suburban Township
Zoning Ordinance Which Does Not Provide for Apartments as Permissible Residential
Use Violates Due Process, 23 ALA. L. REV. 157 (1970); Comment, Constitutional Law
-Equal Protection Extended to Municipal Services-Possible Application to Exclu-
sionary Zoning, 17 N.Y.L. FoRum 599 (1971); Comment, The Constitutional Implica-
tions of a Restrictive Definition of Family in Zoning Ordinances, 17 S.D.L. REv. 203
(1972); Comment, Zoning, Communes and Equal Protection, 1973 URBAN L. ANNUAL
319; Note, Constitutional Lmv-Equal Protection-Zoning--Snob Zoning: Must a Man's
Home Be a Castle?, 69 MiCH. L. REv. 339 (1970); Note, The Constitutionality of Local
Zoning, 79 YALE LJ. 896 (1970); 83 HIv. L. Rnv. 679 (1970).
46. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
47. 2A J. SACKMAN, supra note 14, § 7.519[l], at 7-248.
48. Many earlier cases were strongly opposed to zoning on the basis of aesthetics.
People ex rel. Wineburgh Advertising Co. v. Murphy, 195 N.Y. 126, 135, 88 N.E. 17,
20 (1909); City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Bldg. Co., 112 Ohio St. 654, 661, 148
N.E. 842, 844 (1925). However, as early as 1911 there was some recognition of aes-
thetics as a valid consideration in zoning ordinances. St. Louis Gunning Advertising
Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911). The Gunning decision
was based on some contrived considerations as well as aesthetics (billboards spread fire,
hinder firefighters, and may blow down on pedestrians; dumping of litter and prostitu-
tion occur behind them; criminals lie in wait behind them; and they obstruct sunshine
and air).
Later decisions began more openly to consider aesthetics as a valid basis for zoning.
See, e.g., General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Pub. Parks, 202 Ind. 85,
95, 172 N.E. 309, 312 (1930); Ware v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 157, 214 P.
99, 101 (1923); Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 230, 177 N.E. 427,
430 (1931); State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 271-
72, 69 N.W.2d 217, 222, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955).
The first case where purely aesthetic reasons were used to uphold an ordinance was
City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 (1941). Cf.
City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953) (court recognized re-
lation between aesthetic considerations and economic benefit to community derived from
tourist industry).
Finally the United States Supreme Court declared that aesthetic values are included
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A reasonable relation to some public use will not always suffice
to save a zoning ordinance from invalidation; the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment requires either that all citizens be
treated equally under the zoning scheme, or that there be a reasonable
basis for any difference in treatment.49 The zoning regulations must
be comprehensive and pursuant to a general plan in order to avoid the
pitfalls of arbitrariness and unreasonableness. 50 Furthermore, the zon-
ing ordinances must be applied uniformly so that the promotion of the
public welfare does not affect a small group of individuals inequitably.5 '
Zoning laws which do not meet these requirements of due process and
equal protection are often invalidated as spot zoning.52 This spot zon-
ing singles out an individual owner to bear a burden for the public ben-
efit; it is therefore an unconstitutional use of the police power if due
compensation is not made to the owner. 53
The use of the concept of the "historical district" has been most
successful in preserving historical sites without subjecting the measure
to invalidation as spot zoning. Zoning ordinances creating an historic
district maintain uniformity of an area's historic character by controlling
demolition of and alterations to existing structures as well as limiting
within the concept of public welfare. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Since
this decision, several courts have found ordinances based on aesthetics to be valid. See,
e.g., Cromwell v. Ferrier, 19 N.Y.2d 263, 225 N.E.2d 749, 279 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1967);
People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734 (1963); Oregon
City v. Hartke, 240 Ore. 35, 400 11.2d 255 (1965). See generally Minano, Aesthetic
Zoning. The Creation of a New Standard, 48 J. UnA. L. 740 (1971); Newsom,
Zoning for Beauty, 5 NEw ENG. L REv. 1 (1969); Norton, Police Power, Planning and
Aesthetics, 7 SANTA CLARA LAw. 171 (1967); Comment, Zoning Aesthetics and the
First Amendment, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 81 (1964); Comment, Aesthetic Control of
Land Use: A House Built Upon the Sand?, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 372 (1964); Comment,
Architectural Control Justified on the Basis of Property Value Protection, 1971 WASH.
U.L.Q. 118; Note, Beyond the Eye of the Beholder: Aesthetics and Objectivity, 71
MIcH. L. REV. 1438 (1973). But cf. Pennsylvania v. Morton, 381 F. Supp. 293 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193,
311 A.2d 588 (1973) (courts rebuffed efforts of commonwealth to block construction of
incongruous tower overlooking Gettysburg battlefield). For an exhaustive treatment of
the issue, see Comment, The Gettysburg Tower Case: Testing Pennsylvania's Environ-
mental Rights Amendment, 48 TaMP. L.Q. 46 (1974).
49. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
50. Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 124, 96 N.E.2d 731, 735
(1951).
51. See Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121
N.E.2d 517 (1954).
52. See, e.g., Cassel v. Mayor & City Council, 195 Md. 348, 73 A.2d 486 (1950);
Page v. City of Portland, 178 Ore. 632, 641, 165 P.2d 280, 284 (1946); Weaver v. Ham,
149 Tex. 309, 232 S.W.2d 704, 709 (1950).
53. Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 498-99, 121
N.E.2d 517, 519 (1954). See note 43 supra.
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construction of buildings to those which conform to the present char-
acter of the district.54
The courts have repeatedly sustained architectural control ordi-
nances creating historic districts as valid exercises of the police power.5
For instance, the Louisiana Supreme Court in City of New Orleans v.
Pergament5" upheld an ordinance which required approval by the
Vieux Carr6 Commission for any change in appearance, color, material,
or architectural design or any new construction, demolition, or repair
to any building in the historic district.5 7 The defendant was prosecuted
for displaying on his building, which was without historic value, a large
sign violative of the ordinance. He claimed that application of the ord-
inance to his building would deprive him of his property without due
process of law and deny him equal protection of the laws.5
In sustaining the power of the Commission under the fourteenth
amendment, the court stressed that the prescribed standards and re-
quirements were uniform and binding on all persons similarly situa-
ted." Thus, application of the prohibition (against the display of large
signs in the French Quarter) to proprietors of modem buildings as
well as to the owners of the ancient buildings in the district was not
a discriminatory spot zoning scheme. 60 The purpose of the ordinance
was not only to preserve the antiquity of the old quarter, but also to
maintain the "tout ensemble" of the area's unique character."' Prohib-
iting eyesores is certainly essential to such preservation efforts.
Although zoning plans involving historic districts pass judicial
scrutiny under the standards of due process and equal protection, dif-
54. For digests of the zoning ordinances creating various historic districts in the
United States, see J. MoRiusoN, supra note 3, at 129-86.
55. See, e.g., M & N Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Springfield, 111 Ill. App. 2d 444,
250 N.E.2d 289 (1969); Rebman v. City of Springfield, 111 i1. App. 2d 430, 250
N.E.2d 282 (1969); City of New Orleans v. Levy, 233 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953);
City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941); City of New
Orleans v. Impastato, 198 La. 206, 3 So. 2d 559 (1941); Opinion of the Justices to the
Senate (Beacon Hill), 333 Mass. 783, 128 N.E.2d 563 (1955); Opinion of the Justices
to the Senate (Nantucket), 333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955); City of Santa Fe
v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389 P.2d 13 (1964).
56. 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941).
57. NEw ORLEANS, LA., CITY CODE §§ 65-1 to -33 (1940).
58. 198 La. at 854-55, 5 So. 2d at 130.
59. Id. at 858, 5 So. 2d at 131.
60. Id.
61. The court emphasized that more than the preservation of ancient buildings was
necessary to the maintenance of the unique flavor of the Vieux Carr6:
The purpose of the ordinance is not only to preserve the old buildings them-
selves, but to preserve the antiquity of the whole French and Spanish quarter,
the tout ensemble, so to speak, by defending this relic against iconoclasm or
vandalism. Id. at 858, 5 So. 2d at 131, quoted in Maher v. City of New
Orleans, 371 F. Supp. 653, 663 (E.D. La. 1974).
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ferent problems arise when individual landmarks are designated for
preservation. In urban areas there are often isolated historic monu-
ments for which the creation of an historic district is not feasible.
When individual structures are singled out for special restrictions, the
question again arises whether there is compensable spot zoning.
JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF ZONING REGULATIONS LIMITING OWNERS'
RIGHTS TO ALTER HISTORIC LANDMARKS
As zoning regulations have been implemented to preserve urban
landmarks, the owners of these monuments are frequently faced with
loss of potential income from development of the property. Recently
owners have begun to challenge such restrictions as amounting to a tak-
ing of their property for which they are entitled to compensation.
Courts have approached the issue in two ways. One view is that there
is a taking whenever the owner's right to develop his property in a cho-
sen manner is severely impaired. The other approach is that, when the
preservation ordinance allows the owner a reasonable use of his prop-
erty, there is no taking and therefore no requirement of compensation.
Protecting Development Rights: The Expansive Approach to "Taking"
The recent case of Lutheran Church in America v. City of New
York 2 introduced a broad concept of taking whereby restrictions on
the owner's plans for development of his property were deemed confis-
catory. In that decision, -the Court of Appeals of New York held the
designation of the plaintiff's Brownstone building63 as an historic land-
mark a violation of due process. The New York City Landmarks Pres-
ervation Law6" created the Landmarks Preservation Commission and
62. 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974), noted in 3 FoRDHAm
L.J. 123 (1974).
The Lutheran Church case has been followed in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City
of New York, (Sup. Ct. N.Y.), reported in 173 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 23, 1975, at 16, ol. 3
(court held that Landmarks Preservation Commission could not require Penn Central
to maintain Grand Central Station as landmark without compensation).
63. The building in question dated from the mid-nineteenth century. It was a sig-
nificant early example of Anglo-Italiante architecture and one of the few free standing
Brownstone buildings remaining in New York City. J.P. Morgan, Jr., had lived in the
house for a number of years. 35 N.Y.2d at 125, 316 N.E.2d at 308, 359 N.Y.S.2d at
11.
64. NEw YoRK, N.Y., CHARTEt & ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, §§ 207-1.0 et seq. (1965).
For a discussion of constitutional problems involved in application of the Landmarks
Preservation Law, see Wolf, The Landmark Problem in New York, 22 N.Y.U. IN1RA.
L. REv. 99 (1967).
In Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Comm'n, 51 Misc. 2d 556, 273
N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1966), the New York Supreme Court upheld the general ap-
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gave it power to designate individual properties as historic landmarks.
Such designations are to be made after notice and a public hearing."
Subsequent to the designation the owner of the building must apply
to the Landmarks Preservation Commission for permission to alter or
demolish his building.66
From its purchase by the Lutheran Church in 1942 7 to the time
of the action, the building had provided offices for religious-corporate
purposes. As the Church's office space requirements expanded, plans
were made to demolish the old building and construct a new one.""
Soon thereafter, the Landmarks Preservation Commission designated
the building a landmark. As a result of the restrictions on alterations
or demolition, the building became inadequate for the Church's con-
templated uses. 69 Because the Commission was prohibiting the owner
from adapting its property to its expanded needs without providing full
compensation,"0 the court of appeals held that the landmark designa-
tion amounted to a "naked taking." 71
proach of the Landmarks Preservation Law. In holding that the statute was not confis-
catory, the court remarked:
Petitioner is free to do as it pleases with the interior of the building. It is
guaranteed a reasonable return on its investment. And if no plan can be
devised to materialize this guarantee, it may make such changes as it wishes.
Id. at 560, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
65. NEw YoRx, N.Y., CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE ch. 8-A, § 207-2.0(a), (c), -12.0
(1965).
66. Id., § 207-5.0(a). In cases where demolition or radical alteration is sought by
the owner, the commission probably would not grant permission.
The law contains provisions for the compensation of owners unduly burdened by
the restrictions. Upon a showing by the owner seeking alteration that he is failing to
realize at least a six per cent return on his property (id. § 207-1.0(9)), the commission
is given discretion to ease the hardship by either effectuating a real estate tax rebate
(id. 207-8.0(c)), producing a buyer or lessee who could profitably utilize the premises
without the desired alteration or demolition (id. § 207-8.0(a) (2) (i)), or exercising the
power of condemnation (id. § 207-8.0(g)(2)). However, religious corporations, such
as the plaintiff in the Lutheran Church case, are not subject to the ameliorative provision
allowing condemnation. Id. § 207-8.0(i) (1). The provisions for providing relief in
cases of property devoted to charitable uses are limited to instances where the institution
desires to alienate the property by sale or lease. Id. §§ 207-8.0(a)(1), (6).
67. The building was constructed in 1853 and was used as a residence until 1942,
when it was purchased by the plaintiff's predecessor, The United Lutheran Church in
America. It then was converted to office use. In November, 1965, the Landmarks
Preservation Commission designated the building a "landmark." 35 N.Y.2d at 124, 316
N.E.2d at 307, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 10.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. The ameliorative provision of the Landmarks Preservation Law allowing for
condemnation and full compensation was not applicable to this owner. See note 66 su-
pra.
71. Id. at 132, 316 N.E.2d at 312, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
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The court began its scrutiny of this governmental interference
with the owner's use of private property in terms of Professor Sax's arb-
itral-enterprise distinction.72 Noting that severe limitations on the free
use of property may amount to a taking by the government in its enter-
prise capacity, the court found here a taking for public use:
In the instant case it could likewise be well argued that the com-
mission has added the Morgan house to the resources of the city by the
designation (it being argued, inter alia, that the house, as a tourist at-
traction because of its designation, aids the city generally), and that
while such designations might not wreak confiscatory results in all situa-
tions (as where business might well be promoted by the designation)
it does have that effect here where plaintiff is deprived of the reasonable
use of its land. 73
After observing that the designation was neither part of a districting
plan (i.e., an historic district) nor a prohibition of noxious use, 74 the
court concluded that the designation was confiscatory because it pro-
hibited a use to which the property was devoted at the time the designa-
tion was made. 75
The court also held that the restrictions failed to meet the trad-
itional diminution-in-value test.76 Because the building was no longer
adequate for the plaintiff's office needs, the court found that its char-
itable purpose would be impeded significantly by the restrictions as-
sociated with the landmark designation. 77  Termination of such "free
use" of the premises was held to be properly exercisable only under
72. Id. at 128-29, 316 N.E.2d at 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 14. See notes 39-42 supra
and accompanying text.
73. Id. at 130, 316 N.E.2d at 311, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
74. Id. at 129, 316 N.E.2d at 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
75. The court of appeals indicated its finding that the designation did prohibit a use
to which the property was devoted at the time of the enactment of the ordinance:
Here, plaintiff has submitted ample proof not seriously contested, that the use
to which the property has been put for over 20 years would have to cease
because of the inability under the designation to replace the building. Id.
The court found that there was a confiscation because the commission invaded the
owner's right to own and manage its property:
Legitimate zoning . . . does not appropriate to public use. Where the owner
can make a case for alteration or demolition the municipality would have to
relinquish the designation, provide agreeable alternatives or condemn the prem-
ises. Id. at 132, 316 N.E.2d at 312, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
76. See notes 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
77. Id.; cf. Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor v. Platt, 29 App. Div. 2d 376, 288
N.Y.2d 314 (App. Div. 1968). Here the court ruled that relief must be forthcoming
whenever the landmarks designation would physically or financially prevent or seriously
interfere with carrying out the owner's charitable purpose. The court declined to declare
the Landmarks Preservation Law unconstitutional, and remarked that the fact that the
statute gave the commission power to provide relief in certain situations did not restrict
the court from doing so in other situations. Id.
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the power of eminent domain,'7 not under the police power. Thus,
the court adhered to the older diminution-in-value test, with its broader
protection for landowners, rather than the modified diminution-in-value
rule.79
In Lutheran Church the Landmarks Preservation Law provided
for the designation of single buildings throughout the city instead of
the creation of historic districts. It is true that legitimate zoning must
be pursuant to a comprehensive plan or policy; 0 however, this require-
ment will not invalidate restrictions on the use of particular lots within
a district, so long as the restrictions are not arbitrary and are based upon
reasonable distinctions.81 The presence of a building of unusual histor-
ical or architectural significance would seem to be a reasonable basis
for distinguishing one lot in midtown Manhattan from surrounding
lots. 2 Indeed, the comprehensive policy promoted by such legislation
would be to identify structures with such a distinction and ensure that
the unique features are preserved. The fact that the owner of an his-
toric building is treated differently from his neighbor, whose building
is of no historic importance, does not amount to spot zoning. 3 It
would seem, then, that the absence of an historic district, a fact relied
upon by the court, 4 is without legal significance.
The court's specific analysis of the taking question also must be
rejected, even if one accepts the arbitral-enterprise analysis adopted by
the court. Although the court viewed the landmark designation as an
enterprise function (hence, a taking), 5 there was actually no use of
the structure by the city to justify such a characterization. While con-
fiscation of land for the operation of a sewage treatment plant or public
park is an enterprise function, 8 the landmark designation did not seek
to create an easement or public right of entry, as in the case of a park.
Because the preservation of the building was not in the best economic
interest of the owner, but was of benefit to the whole community, the
court found that there was a confiscation by government in its enter-
78. 35 N.Y.2d at 132, 316 N.E.2d at 312, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
79. See notes 29-37 supra and accompanying text.
80. See notes 49-53 supra and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Bartram v. Zoning Comm'n, 136 Conn. 89, 68 A.2d 308 (1949) (court
held zoning of small business districts in otherwise exclusively residential areas was per-
missible as part of comprehensive municipal policy of encouraging decentralization of
business in order to relieve traffic congestion).
82. See Comment, note 5 supra, at 620.
83. See notes 52-53 supra and accompanying text.
84. 35 N.Y.2d at 124, 129, 316 N.E.2d at 307, 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 10, 14.
85. See notes 38-43 supra and accompanying text.
86. See text following note 43 supra.
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prise capacity. 7  Yet, if these criteria alone were sufficient to consti-
tute an enterprise function, many residential zoning restrictions would
be prohibited under that test, since restriction of a lot to residential use
would be of economic benefit to the neighborhood but not the owner. 8 s
A more basic error is the court's expansion beyond all recognition
of the "prior use" concept. Although the court held that the limitation
upon the Church's use of the building for offices was confiscatory, 9
the landmark designation did not in fact restrict the prior use of the
building. Actually, under the Landmarks Preservation Law the plain-
tiff would be allowed to continue the same office use which had been
conducted in the building before the designation, but would not be al-
lowed to expand that use as its needs for further office space grew.
If the court's view were adopted, many heretofore valid zoning regula-
tions would be held to curtail the owner's prior use. For instance, a
corporation would be free to violate a height restriction on its building
(i.e., the maximum height allowed for any structure on the lot) once
the business expanded so as to require more office space. In contrast,
under existing law the corporation would have to purchase another lot
for the new construction without any compensation from the zoning
authority. 0 The facts of Lutheran Church presented a peculiarly in-
appropriate situation for such a departure from prior authority, since
the development sought by the owner would have required a change
in zoning. 1 It is remarkable that the court upheld the plaintiffs right
to demolish a building on the ground that a new building was needed
for the plaintiff's corporate operations, when the proposed replacement
was prevented by unchallenged zoning restrictions.
It is evident that the court's finding of a taking arose from the fact
that the owner's development rights were curtailed.92 The court did
hint that the city might avoid the choice between condemnation and
relinquishment of the designation by "agreeable alternatives." 93  How-
87. Id. at 130, 316 N.E.2d at 311, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 15.
88. Although the valuable increase in the areas tourism resulting from historic pres-
ervation legislation may be distinguishable from the increased value to homeowners in
a residential zone, in both instances the zoning restrictions boost the marketable value
of the surrounding property while limiting the commercial value of the individual lot.
89. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
90. See generally Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1909).
91. 35 N.Y.2d at 133 n.2, 316 N.E.2d at 313 n.2, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 18 n.2 (dissenting
opinion).,
92. Id. at 129, 316 N.E.2d at 310, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 14, citing Vernon Park Realty,
Inc. v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954) (zoning ordinance
limiting business use of plaintiff's property to parking automobiles and incidental serv-
ices declared to be unconstitutional confiscation).
93. 35 N.Y.2d at 132, 316 N.E.2d at 312, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
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ever, the court seemed to proceed on the assumption that nothing less
than maximum utilization of the property for the owner's chosen pur-
poses would be agreeable This all embracing definition of a taking
would seem to preclude any historic preservation efforts without con-
demnation, except in the rare instance where the owner's use happens
to coincide with the preservationists' goals.
Protection of Historic Landmarks: The Balanced Approach to "Taking"
Another recent case, Maher v. City of New Orleans,94 represents
a more limited view of the taking concept under which historic designa-
tions that impede an owner's development plans will often be sustained.
In the Maher case a federal district court upheld the constitutionality
of the Vieux Carr6 Ordinance95 even though it was applied to prevent
development of property. Under the ordinance any construction, dem-
olition, or alteration to any building on any street or alley in the French
Quarter must be approved by the Vieux Carr6 Commission." As in
Lutheran Church, the landowner was attempting to develop his prop-
erty to enhance its usefulness but was prevented from doing so by the
preservation ordinance. The -plaintiff in Maher was the owner of a
Victorian cottage in the Vieux Carr6, which he wished to demolish and
replace with an addition to his home.97 After Maher's application to
demolish the cottage was denied by the City Council 98 and the state
courts upheld denial of the demolition permit,99 he filed suit in federal
district court seeking a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the ord-
inance and an injunction against its enforcement. 10
94. 371 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1974).
95. NEW ORLEANS, LA., Crry CODE §§ 65-1 to -33 (1940). See text accompanying
note 57 supra for a summary of the statute.
96. Id. § 65-8.
97. Maher wished to include seven apartments in the addition for rental purposes.
371 F. Supp. at 655.
98. In March, 1963, Maher applied to the Vieux Carr6 Commission for a demolition
permit. The commission denied the application in April, 1963, and again in September,
1963. In October, 1973, Maher applied once more to the commission, and the applica-
tion was approved in December, 1963. In February, 1964, a group of property owners
(Vieux Carr6 Property Owners and Associates, Inc.) appealed the decision to the City
Council, which after a hearing overruled the commission's decision and ordered that the
permit not be issued. In July, 1964, it was determined in Civil District Court for Or-
leans Parish that the council's decision was void since the council had considered the
matter before Maher had requested a permit from the City Department of Safety and
Permits. After a second hearing, in August, 1966, the City Council reaffirmed its prior
decision in overruling the Vieux Carrd Commission and denying the application for a
demolition permit. 371 F. Supp. at 656.
99. For reports of the case in the state courts, see Maher v. City of New Orleans,
256 La. 131, 235 So. 2d 402 (1970), aff'g 222 So. 2d 608 (La. App. 1969).
100. Jurisdiction was based upon the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201,
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In deciding for the City, the court held that the zoning ordinance
was a valid exercise of the police power and was not confiscatory as
applied to the plaintiffs cottage. Maher's contention -that the general
regulatory scheme of the Vieux Carr6 Ordinance could be accomp-
lished only through the exercise of eminent domain was summarily dis-
missed.' 0 ' The validity of such architectural control ordinances which
establish historic districts is well-settled. 02 To the plaintiffs charge
that the zoning classification was arbitrary as applied to the Victorian
cottage of "no historical or architectural value,"'0 3 the court recalled
the tout ensemble doctrine enunciated in City of New Orleans v. Perga-
ment'0 4 and deferred to the zoning authority's judgment as to the value
of the cottage to the area's overall atmosphere. 0 5
It is in 'this narrow conception of what constitutes a taking that
the court's rationale diverges from that of Lutheran Church. The test
2281 (1970), which authorizes a three-judge court to issue an injunction restraining the
enforcement, operation, or execution of any state statute upon the ground of its unconsti-
tutionality.
101. 371 F. Supp. at 661.
102. See note 55 supra and accompanying text. If the zoning authority were required
to condemn all property in such historic districts, then obviously the districts would be
very small if they existed at all.
103. Pre-trial Brief for Plaintiff at 25, Maher v. City of New Orleans, 371 F. Supp.
653 (E.D. La. 1974).
104. 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d 129 (1941). See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
105. While Maher proposed to replace the Victorian cottage with a Spanish-style
building, the court deferred to the judgment of the City Council and the Vieux Carr6
Commission as to the preferability of preserving the cottage to the construction of a
modified replica of an earlier style:
mhe Vieux Carr6 is more than a museum of French and Spanish architec-
tural styles but is a mixture of construction unique to New Orleans, as well
as a living residential and commercial neighborhood containing a lively pot-
pourri of socio-economic and personal lifestyles. In many cases, it could well
be a disservice to the "charm and distinctive character" of the Vieux Carr6 topermit the demolition of existing buildings in order to create new replicas of
the past. 371 F. Supp. at 664.
Further, the court held that the Vieux Carr6 Ordinance was not an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative authority because of a lack of adequate standards. Id. The
fierce disagreement of the experts in this case might have suggested that the standards
were too vague to be followed evenly by the Vieux Carr6 Commission and 'the City
Council. However, the court noted that zoning standards need not be specific, but may
be broad, general standards "so long as they are capable of a reasonable application and
are sufficient to limit and define the Board's discretionary powers." Id., quoting City
of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 417, 389 P.2d 13, 18 (1964). See
also Gilman v. City of Newark, 73 N.J. Super. 562, 180 A.2d 365, 384 (1962); Hiscox
v. Levine, 31 Misc. 2d 151, 153, 216 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804-05 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Miller v.
City of Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d 374, 388-89, 378 P.2d 464, 473 (1963).
The mandate to preserve the character of the Vieux Carr6 supplied a general guide-
line for the council and commission, and the Maher court would allow these representa-
tive bodies to make the decisions as to which buildings in the district are worthy of pres-
ervation. 371 F. Supp. at 664.
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for confiscation was whether the ordinance "goes so far as to preclude
the use of the property for any purpose for which it is reasonably adap-
ted."'106 Since -the cottage could be repaired and rented, the court
found that the restrictions did not make the property unusable for the
purpose of rental. 10 7  Further, it was noted that Maher presumably
could sell his property for a fair price.'08 Thus, to show confiscation
under this standard, the owner would have to prove that he has been
deprived of a reasonable use or return from his property. A mere
showing that the owner could make much better use of the property
without the restrictions would not suffice.'0 9
Accordingly, the Maher court did not view the denial of a demoli-
tion permit to the owner as confiscatory-since Maher could rent or
sell the cottage,"10 he had not been deprived of his property. It is cleat
that such reasoning might have led to a different result in Lutheran
Church, where there was no showing that the Church could not reason-
ably rent or sell the existing offices in the Brownstone building. Al-
though the religious corporation would be forced to seek additional of-
fice space elsewhere for its expanded needs, the Maher court would
view this inconvenience as insufficient to constitute a taking so long
as the prior reasonable use was unobstructed and the alternative of leas-
ing or selling the property for a good price was available. The Maher
court thus differs from the Lutheran Church court in not viewing the
serious impairment of development rights as a taking.
In addition to recognizing the well-established principle that valid
106. Id., quoting Summers v. City of Glen Cove, 17 N.Y.2d 307, 309, 217 N.E.2d
663, 664, 270 N.Y.S.2d 611, 612 (1966).
A zoning ordinance ordinarily reduces the value of the rights of some individuals;
that fact alone does not give rise to unconstitutionality. Neef v. City of Springfield,
380 Ill. 275, 282, 43 N.E.2d 947, 951 (1942). See also Michigan-Lake Bldg. Corp. v.
Hamilton, 340 111. 284, 172 N.E. 710 (1930); Minkus v. Pond, 326 Ill. 467, 158 N.E.
121 (1927); City of Aurora v. Bums, 319 Ill. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925). See note 90
supra and accomanying text.
107. 371 F. Supp. at 662.
108. Id. It should be noted that the court assumed the property to be marketable
with the restrictions, in the absence of a contrary showing by the owner, rather than
requiring the city to prove this fact.
109. In Lutheran Church the right of the owner to construct another building with
additional office space was upheld over the provisions of the Landmarks Preservation
Law. By contrast, Maher was not allowed to construct a new apartment building on
his lot: he was relegated to renting the cottage as a single family residence or perform-
ing permissible remodeling in order to rent to more than one family. Id. No doubt,
the income from the rental permitted under the ordinance falls short of that available
from a seven-apartment structure in the same location.
110. See notes 107-108 supra and accompanying text.
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zoning can curtail development rights,"1- the Maher decision also ad-
heres more closely to the modified diminution-in-value rule."1 2 The
court focused on the harm to the public which would result from viola-
tions of the Vieux Carr6 Ordinance, as well as the benefit accruing to
the public from its enforcement."' The New York Court of Appeals
took a contrary approach. Holding that preservation of the landmark
was a benefit shared by the community, the court decided that the bur-
den on the plaintiff for the public benefit was sufficient to constitute
a taking. However, as in the case of restrictions designed to prevent
harm from a change in the natural character of property," 4 a landmark
designation to preserve a building's existing condition would not be
considered a taking under the modified test for diminished value.
CONCLUSION
Although the increasing concern for the preservation of historic
structures has been reflected in many decisions, the Lutheran Church
opinion represents serious judicial doubts about burdening a landowner
with development restrictions without full compensation. Under the
expansive definition of a taking, whenever the historic preservation or-
dinance seriously impairs the owner's development rights, a failure to
compensate will result in an impermissible confiscation. In the case
of urban landmarks, such ordinances will almost always significantly
curtail development potential. However, budgetary restraints on pre-
servation commissions will prohibit condemnation of many landmarks
worth saving. Thus, under the approach of the New York Court of
Appeals, the fate of many historic buildings will depend on the personal
inclinations and financial desires of their owners. Given the high mar-
ket value of urban property, the prospects for condemnation or volun-
tary preservation of most landmarks are bleak.
In contrast, where courts follow the balanced approach of
the Maher decision, destruction of historic structures may be curbed
by zoning regulations on the ground that destruction of landmarks is
a harm to the public which may be checked by exercise of the police
power. While New York's expansive approach insulates the owner's
111. See note 90 supra and accompanying text.
112. See notes 29-37 supra and accompanying text.
113. For instance, the court refers to the demolition of existing buildings in the
French Quarter as a "disservice to the 'charm and distinctive character' of the Vieux
Carr6". Id. at 664.
114. See Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation Dev.
Comm'n, 11 Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1970); Just v. Marinette County,
56 Wis. 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
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expanding use of his property from the restrictions of historic zoning
regulations, the Maher view of taking adheres to the modified diminu-
tion-in-value test, thus protecting the owner's actual prior use of the
property, while still allowing the state to limit the property's develop-
ment potential insofar as necessary for preservation of its historic char-
acter. Furthermore, the test proposed in Maher would guarantee the
availability of reasonable alternatives to the owner's present use of his
property. Thus, meager condemnation funds can be saved for those
instances where preservation of our heritage would require limitation
of the owner's present use. For each decision like Lutheran Church
there is an irretrievable loss to this heritage."
5
115. The British recently have become very aware of the need to protect their historic
buildings. For a survey of the successful means employed for landmark preservation
in the United Kingdom, see Ashworth, Contemporary Developments in British Preser-
vation Law and Practice, 36 LAW & Cowmaru'. PROB. 348 (1971).

